Secure code review services in India
A person on our team reads the code you choose, at a named commit (the exact saved version of your code), against a standard you name. Some weaknesses, like a login account written into the code, usually can't be seen from outside the running app.
What reading the code finds
Against outside testing, the source shows secrets the running app hides. Against a scanner, a person brings knowledge of your application.
Passwords, tokens and keys hard-coded into the app (CWE-798). Credentials in configuration files can be found from outside, MITRE notes, but a hard-coded account for incoming logins is typically "not visible outside of the code". UIDAI, the Aadhaar authority, asks for this check in control 72.
Scanners leave business logic flaws untouched, OWASP's Code Review Guide says, calling it "the biggest limitation of static code analyzers". They also miss design issues a person reading the implementation can often spot.
Against automated tools, NIST's SA-11(4) says manual review pays off where knowing your application matters: checking who may do what (access control matrices) against the application's controls, and the detail of cryptographic implementations.
Reading against running
MITRE's ratings put a person level with a scanner: reading the source and scanning it with a tool (static application security testing, or SAST) are both rated High for SQL injection (CWE-89), a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm (CWE-327) and hard-coded credentials (CWE-798). The case for a person rests on context, which OWASP and NIST argue in words, not ratings.
Against outside testing, the ratings favour reading. For hard-coded credentials, MITRE rates black-box testing (probing the running app without the code) only Moderate. NIST's Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) numbers the two apart: reading code is practice PW.7, testing the running program is PW.8.
MITRE's rows here are Manual Static Analysis - Source Code and Automated Static Analysis - Source Code, on its SOAR scale. High is "a method that succeeds frequently and does not result in many false reports"; Moderate may miss coverage or give incorrect reports. Every rating "assumes the use of best-of-breed tools, analysts, and methods". On CWE-89, automated analysis can't reach 100% accuracy and coverage, and manual analysis "might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints". Narrative rows, such as CWE-327's Automated Analysis (Moderate), aren't compared.
OWASP's Code Review Guide v2.0 (July 2017), section 5.2: "SAST tools are great for coverage and setting a minimum baseline", but tools "always need human verification". Table 5 credits scanners with less manual effort, every instance found, source-to-sink analysis and exact code snippets; if a manual review gives you less locational detail, challenge it.
CERT-In's Guidelines for Secure Application Design, Development, Implementation and Operations, section 5.1: source code reviews "encompass both manual and automated reviews." SSDF PW.8.1 asks whether to test executable code "to find vulnerabilities not identified by previous reviews, analysis, or testing".
Know what you are buying
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 control SA-11 lists what an acquirer requires of a developer, each as its own obligation. This engagement is the SA-11(4) row.
| Class | Where NIST files it | What it involves |
|---|---|---|
| Static code analysis | SA-11(1) | Tools find common flaws, in your code and in vulnerable, out-of-date or unsupported libraries, and document the results. Best run early, on each change. Many ignored findings (false positives) point to a tool or process problem. |
| Manual code review (this engagement) | SA-11(4) | A person reviews specific code you define, by processes you define, usually for critical components. |
| Dynamic code analysis | SA-11(8) | Tools watch the program as it runs, for memory corruption, user privilege issues and more. Fuzz testing (malformed or random input) is one type. NIST also asks for code coverage analysis. |
| Interactive application security testing (IAST) | SA-11(9) | Tools watch the application from inside (through added monitoring code) during testing, and document the results. It needs a running application. |
| Composition analysis of acquired components | Not an SA-11 enhancement. SSDF v1.1 files it at PW.4.1 and PS.3.2. | The provenance and risk of each component you acquire. SP 800-218 names it at PW.4.1 Example 3 and RV.1.1, never under PW.7 or PW.8. |
How we work
You name the repository, branch and commit, and the modules in scope. OWASP warns that "it would be irresponsible to decide all modules are high risk", so your management ranks them.
Language, framework and build decide whether a usable analyzer exists for your stack. Business rules, sensitive data and user roles turn a pattern into a ranked finding. Documents are often out of date, so OWASP suggests a session with your developers and lead architect. A threat model, if you have one, shows what to read first.
A person reads the in-scope code. Earlier reviews and scanner output are inputs, as SSDF PW.7.2 Example 1 asks.
Each finding names the file, the line and the root cause, with a CWE reference you can check against MITRE.
Your team logs, triages and fixes findings in its own tracker, as SSDF PW.7.2 asks. We verify the fixes; that's included.
Scope and limits
Section 4 of CERT-In's audit policy guidelines addresses CERT-In empanelled auditing organizations and their auditees. SecWiz is not an empanelled auditor. If your obligation names one from that list, the work goes to a firm on it.
PCI DSS (the payment card industry's security standard), at 6.2.3 and 6.2.3.1, expects software reviewed before release; for manual review, by someone other than its author, with management approval. NIST SA-11(3) has you require an independent agent to verify the developer's assessment plans and test evidence, against independence criteria you write. You operate these controls, not an outside reviewer.
We sign the report and every finding. Your risk owners sign the fix decisions and the release approval. No report from us says you satisfy SA-11 or any other control; that is for your assessor.
A bounded engagement. Which tools run in your build pipeline, what their findings are allowed to do to a build and where findings land is DevSecOps consulting. Building a threat model is a separate threat modeling engagement. To check a report before you accept it, see what a vulnerability management report contains.
SEBI's Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework (CSCRF), PR.DS.S6.1, mandatory for market infrastructure institutions and Qualified REs (regulated entities): REs "shall obtain the source codes for all critical applications from their third-party service providers", or, failing that, a source code escrow or equivalent.
RBI's Master Direction on Digital Payment Security Controls, RBI/2020-21/74, 18 February 2021, clause 23, requires an escrow for third-party licensed applications. It binds Scheduled Commercial Banks other than Regional Rural Banks, plus Small Finance Banks, Payments Banks and Credit card issuing NBFCs (non-banking financial companies).
IEEE 1028-2008, IEEE Standard for Software Reviews and Audits (published 15 August 2008; Inactive-Reserved since 7 November 2019), defines management reviews, technical reviews, inspections, walk-throughs and audits, but "procedures for determining the necessity of a review or audit are not defined".
FAQ
A person reading your source code for security weaknesses. OWASP's Code Review Guide: verifying that security and logical controls "are present, that they work as intended, and that they have been invoked in the right places." NIST's SSDF Version 1.1 (February 2022), task PW.7.1, separates "code review (a person looks directly at the code to find issues)" from code analysis by tools, and leaves the choice to you.
Not on the evidence MITRE publishes. MITRE rates manual and automated source-code analysis both High for SQL injection (CWE-89), a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm (CWE-327) and hard-coded credentials (CWE-798). A person adds context: NIST's SA-11(4) points to the application's requirements and context; Table 6 of OWASP's Code Review Guide to business logic flaws, design flaws and limited language scope.
The clearest scored case is hard-coded credentials (CWE-798). MITRE rates Black Box only Moderate there, because an account hard-coded for incoming logins is typically "not visible outside of the code". Both source-code rows are High. So the question is not tool against person, but whether anyone reads the source.
NIST numbers them apart: SSDF practice PW.7 is "Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code", and PW.8 is "Test Executable Code". A review reads what is written; a test exercises what is running. They overlap but don't substitute for each other. Vulnerability assessment of the running application is scoped separately.
Yes. Its audit policy guidelines, Version 1.0, 25 July 2025, list source code review at section 6, item ix, apart from vulnerability assessments (item iii) and application security testing (item xii). Section 4 says whom the guidelines address, so read your own obligation first. No review report satisfies, certifies or discharges a requirement; it supplies evidence your auditor evaluates.
Control 72 of UIDAI's AUA/KUA compliance checklist, Version 2.0, May 2025, sits in section J, Application Security, under the heading Application code review, and reads: "AUA/KUA should ensure that the passwords, tokens, security keys and licenses are not hardcoded in the application code." That is CWE-798 as a control. It doesn't settle who performs the work, and section J holds other obligations; read it whole before scoping.
The repository, branch and commit, and the modules your management ranks as worth reviewing. Then: language, framework and build system; business rules, sensitive data and user roles; your secure coding standard, if any; existing tool output and its triage; any threat model. Report handling and non-disclosure belong in your contract.
A published baseline, named in the scope before work starts. SSDF task PW.7.2 asks for review "based on the organization's secure coding standards"; without one, OWASP's Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) is the usual substitute. Naming it gives any dispute about a defect something to appeal to.
Let's talk
Tell us the branch, your top-ranked modules and the standard to read them against. No ranking yet? Describe the application and we'll say what to decide first. We reply within one working day.