PS.2.1 asks you to give software acquirers integrity verification information; PS.3.2, to keep provenance data for each release, for example in a software bill of materials (SBOM). SLSA v1.2, the current Approved specification, has a Build track (L0 to L3) and a Source track (L1 to L4). It does not show whether developers coded securely, and "provenance doesn't do anything unless somebody inspects it", so verification gets a named owner and a named behavior on failure. CICD-SEC-9 asks for third-party hashes and signatures to be checked before use.
CERT-In section 4.15 asks organizations to keep an SBOM and avoid vulnerable components. SEBI's Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework (CSCRF), GV.SC.S5, requires an SBOM for new software procurements of core and critical activities, kept updated with every upgrade or change, and lists nine contents, among them transitive dependencies, component hashes and "Known unknown (where a SBOM does not include a full dependency graph)". If one cannot be obtained for a legacy or proprietary system, the Board, Partners or Proprietor must approve that "with proper limitation, rationale, and risk management approach". A default generator meets some items, not all.