Home All services
Start a project → Call Now

PCI DSS compliance services

Make your PCI DSS scope smaller — then meet it.

We find where card numbers really go, then help you shrink what PCI DSS covers, close the gaps and gather evidence. Compliance is shown by a signed Attestation of Compliance (AOC), not a certificate, and we're clear about who signs it: not us.

  • Scope cut before controls are bought
  • Re-scan after every fix included
  • We reply within one working day.
  • PCI DSS v4.0.1
  • CVSS v4.0
  • RBI PA Directions, 2025
Illustration: eight rounded blocks on the floor, mostly white, with a glowing outline around just one of them, where a blank payment card rests beside a twisted ribbon of blue glass, standing for card data kept in one small protected area

In brief

What it is
PCI DSS is the card industry's security standard, set by the PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC). We help you shrink what it covers, then meet the rest.
Why it matters
Every system in scope needs controls and evidence at every yearly assessment. How you take card payments decides most of that cost.
What you get
A documented scope made as small as your business allows, help closing the gaps against v4.0.1, and evidence ready for whoever signs.

Deliverables

A plan for a smaller scope, and evidence for what stays in.

Scope reduction design

Target data flows and costed options for shrinking scope. You pick the one your business can live with.

Scope document and data-flow diagrams

Which systems are in scope and where account data flows. Required under 12.5.1 and 12.5.2. Service providers reconfirm scope every six months under 12.5.2.1, merchants every twelve.

Targeted risk analyses

One for each requirement that lets you choose how often a task is done, under 12.3.1. We draft them; you own and review them yearly. A corporate risk register can't stand in.

Payment page script control

The 6.4.3 script inventory, each script justified in writing, and the 11.6.1 tamper-detection design.

Scanning and hardening evidence

Authenticated internal scans under 11.3.1.2 with a clean re-scan per finding, plus a security configuration review against your Requirement 2.2 standards.

Gap register and evidence trail

Every gap against v4.0.1, ranked and tracked to closure, with the dated evidence your assessor tests.

Why a WAF or a Content-Security-Policy header doesn't replace script control

Requirement 6.4.3 wants every payment page script authorized, integrity-assured and justified in writing, including analytics, chat widgets, tag managers and A/B testing tools from other domains. Requirement 11.6.1 wants tamper detection.

A web application firewall (WAF) sits server-side and sees nothing the browser does. A Content-Security-Policy header restricts what may load, but inventories nothing, assures no integrity and raises no alert when a header changes.

See also compliance as a service, third-party risk management and GRC and compliance.

Scope first

We start with scope: every system that leaves is one less to secure and prove.

Any system that stores, processes or transmits account data is in scope. So is anything connected to it, and anything that could affect its security. That third test is where the bill comes from.

In scope, and probably not on your asset list

  • Copies of card data. Call and screen recordings, file shares, backups, test environments seeded with production card data, the laptops holding the export, and inboxes or ticket queues where customers pasted card numbers.
  • The ways in. The identity provider, jump hosts, bastions and the admin VPN. If it can grant access, it can affect security.
  • Shared platforms. Logging and security event (SIEM) platforms, and wherever logs get shipped for analysis. Patch and configuration management, because anything that can push a package into the cardholder data environment (CDE) is inside it. The hypervisor, the container orchestrator and the cloud control plane.

So before anyone lists controls, we ask how many systems can leave the CDE altogether. Vendor pages quote different requirement totals, because PCI SSC publishes no official count. What sets your cost is how many apply to your systems, and you can change that.

What this work does not include. We are not a PCI SSC Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) Company or an Approved Scanning Vendor. We don't sign your Report on Compliance, run your quarterly external scans or carry out the independent testing that Requirement 11.4 calls for. Nor will we draw a scope boundary that firewall rules, traffic logs and independent testing can't back up.

Capture path

Where the card number lands sets most of the bill.

How you take payments decides which Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) you file and whether your development team is in scope.

Card brands set merchant and service provider levels from transaction volume. Your acquirer, the bank that processes your card payments, decides which validation route it will accept. Not PCI SSC, and not us.
Capture patternDoes card data reach you?Usual validation routeWhat still applies
Full redirect to the processor's own pageNo. The customer leaves your site by HTTP redirect, meta tag, JavaScript or an emailed payment link.SAQ ARequirement 12.8, for managing your provider. The script criterion in the next row doesn't apply.
Embedded iframe or hosted fieldsNo card number (PAN) on your servers, but your page frames theirs.SAQ A, plus the eligibility criterion in force since 31 March 2025You must confirm your site isn't susceptible to script attacks: your own 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 style protections, or a compliant processor's written confirmation that its embedded solution includes them.
Your own checkout form posts the card dataYes, through your web tier, and into your logs if nobody checked.Not SAQ A; your acquirer decides.6.4.2 automated web application protection, 6.4.3 script inventory, 11.6.1 tamper detection, and all of Requirement 3 once a PAN is written anywhere.
Contact center takes card numbers by phoneYes, and the call recordings keep them.Typically SAQ DRecording storage, agent desktops, the telephony platform and every QA reviewer who can replay a call.
Card-present POS behind a validated point-to-point encryption (P2PE) solutionEncrypted at the terminal. You hold ciphertext you have no key for.SAQ P2PEThe strongest reduction available. You still inspect your card terminals (point-of-interaction devices) under 9.5.1.2.1, as often as your own targeted risk analysis sets.

How the work runs

We spend the first weeks trying to make your project smaller.

  1. Find the card data you don't know about

    We search everywhere card numbers end up, from backups to call recordings. Budget 4 to 8 weeks. Scope almost always comes back larger than expected.

  2. Draw the boundary

    We draft the scope document, network diagrams and account data-flow diagrams. Your officer signs them, because they describe your estate, not ours.

  3. Redesign how you take payments

    Move capture to a redirect or hosted fields, tokenize what must persist, put card-present traffic behind validated P2PE, and stop recording card numbers in the contact center. For Indian clients, the 2025 Payment Aggregator Directions bind you to the RBI circular of 6 April 2018 on Storage of Payment System Data. So the country where the data sits matters too.

  4. Prove the boundary

    We run authenticated internal vulnerability scans, triage with CVSS v4.0 and re-scan after every fix, as part of our vulnerability management work. Requirement 11.4 also calls for internal and external penetration testing at least once every 12 months and after any significant change, and we don't perform it. The independent provider you choose does; we prepare its scope and evidence. Where segmentation reduces your scope, that testing covers the segmentation controls too.

  5. Close what's left

    We close the gaps against v4.0.1, finish the evidence trail and hand over to whoever signs.

FAQ

Questions about PCI DSS compliance.

Anything else? Ask us directly.

No, and neither will anyone else. PCI SSC doesn't issue compliance certificates or permit its logos on documents claiming compliance. It recognizes four things as evidence of validation: the Report on Compliance (ROC), the Self-Assessment Questionnaire, the Attestation of Compliance (AOC) and the ASV Attestation of Scan Compliance. What you end up holding is a signed AOC. SecWiz is neither a QSA Company nor an Approved Scanning Vendor, so we prepare you for the signatures instead of providing them.

No, that date has passed. Since 31 March 2025 the 51 requirements introduced in v4.x as best practices have been mandatory, and every assessment scores them. The v4.0.1 PDF, published in June 2024, still prints the best-practice note beside dozens of requirements, but those notes date from publication. They are not live grace periods. If your last gap analysis assumed the grace period, expect 8.4.2, 6.4.2, 6.4.3, 11.6.1 and 10.4.1.1 to come back as failures.

Not out of scope, but close to the smallest scope on offer. Embedded payment pages sit at SAQ A, and since 31 March 2025 SAQ A carries an eligibility criterion that redirect merchants don't have: you must confirm your site isn't susceptible to attacks from scripts that could affect your e-commerce systems. PCI SSC FAQ 1588 gives two ways to meet it: implement 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 style protections yourself, or get written confirmation from a compliant processor that its embedded solution includes script protections. With neither, your SAQ is invalid.

For a mid-sized organization with a genuine CDE and no prior v4.x work, plan 9 to 15 months from kickoff to a signed AOC: scoping and discovery 4 to 8 weeks, gap assessment 8 to 12 weeks, remediation 4 to 9 months, then fieldwork and reporting. Two things stretch it: requirements with a hard technical floor, usually 8.4.2 multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all non-console CDE access, which is architecture rather than configuration; and evidence maturity, because quarterly scan cycles and six-monthly access reviews can't be back-dated. A first ROC inside six months usually means a tiny scope or a plan built on compensating controls.

It reduces scope, sometimes dramatically, but rarely eliminates it. Tokenization removes storage scope and leaves the capture path untouched, so the browser, the form and the transport still count. Outsourcing creates obligations of its own under Requirement 12.8: the provider list, written agreements in which the provider acknowledges responsibility for account data, and ongoing monitoring of their compliance status. Requirement 12.9 applies on top if you're a provider yourself.

Usually the opposite. The customized approach has no printed testing procedures, so your QSA has to derive them for your implementation. You owe a documented targeted risk analysis per control under 12.3.2 plus a controls matrix, and each control must demonstrably meet or exceed the security of the defined requirement. The standard itself says the effort will be greater. Several requirements aren't eligible at all, including the whole of Appendix A2. Nor is it a compensating control: those sit under the defined approach, need a documented technical or business constraint, and are revalidated every year.

No, and it's one of the most common v4.x findings. Requirement 12.3.1 wants a separate targeted risk analysis (TRA) for each requirement that lets you set your own frequency: 5.2.3.1, 5.3.2.1, 7.2.5.1, 8.6.3, 9.5.1.2.1, 10.4.2.1, 11.3.1.1, 11.6.1 and 12.10.4.1. Each names the asset being protected, the threat the requirement guards against and the contributing factors, and is reviewed at least every 12 months. A corporate risk register holds none of that at the detail required. Note that 7.2.5.1 is on the list: only 7.2.4 user account reviews have the fixed six-month cadence.

More than the card brands do. The Reserve Bank of India (Regulation of Payment Aggregators) Directions, 2025, RBI/DPSS/2025-26/141, issued 15 September 2025, write PCI DSS into the regulator's own rules. Clause 9(a) makes you responsible for your merchants' infrastructure being compliant, so onboarding becomes a verification exercise. Annexure 1 clause 1.5 wants quarterly internal and annual external audit reports, bi-annual vulnerability assessment and security testing, and a PCI DSS compliance report carrying both the AOC and the ROC with corrective actions and closure dates. We run the vulnerability assessment. The security testing goes to an independent provider; we prepare its scope and evidence, as for Requirement 11.4. Merchants you onboarded on or before 31 December 2025 had to meet the due-diligence requirements by 15 September 2026.

Let's talk

Find out how small your PCI scope could be.

Tell us how card data reaches you today, and we'll tell you what it would take to stop touching it. We reply within one working day.